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* Richard V. worked seven years for General Motors in Detroit.
Unable to continue because of ruptured discs, he received disability
benefits before actively seeking work again. After his extended UI
benefits expired, he survived on a $345 General Assistance grant,
living in a church rent-free in return for light housekeeping chores.
* Jerome L. worked as a ramp agent for nine years at San Fran-
cisco Airport for Pacific Southwest Airlines and its successor US
Air. Because of several absences from work on account of serious
personal problems, he was fired for misconduct, thus becoming inel-
igible for UI benefits. ' Because state unemployment was over 9% at
the time, he was only able to find a $310 per month job on Sundays
running a city community center. He lived in his father's van for a
while.
The current American welfare reform debate ignores a funda-
mental reason why so many low-income persons rely on income-
maintenance programs ("welfare"): the ineligibility of over half of
the work force for Unemployment Insurance Benefits (UI).2 This
Essay analyzes the reasons for this lack of UI coverage and pro-
poses reforms to ensure coverage under the Unemployment Com-
pensation system to all employable persons.
The national welfare reform debate has regrettably focused ex-
clusively on the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)
program, while ignoring millions of employable, single adults who
* Staff Attorney, Government Benefits Unit, San Francisco Neighborhood
Legal Assistance Foundation.
1. CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 1256 (West 1986).
2. The Unemployment Insurance system is a federal program that (1) aims to
temporarily replace a portion of unemployed worker's lost wages and (2) helps stabi-
lize the economy during a recession by providing the unemployed a part of their lost
purchasing power. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, HRD-93-107, UNEMPLOYMENT
INSURANCE: PROGRAM'S ABILITY TO MEET OBJECTIVES JEOPARDIZED 13
(1993)[hereinafter GAO REPORT]. The Unemployment Insurance system provides
benefits, generally for up to twenty-six weeks, to unemployed workers who have
worked long enough and earned sufficient wages to meet their states' minimum eligi-
bility standards. Id.
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survive on benefits of less than $300 per month, and who in many
cases live in states that in recent years have either abolished their
General Assistance (GA) programs, imposed time-limits to those
programs or reduced GA benefits so severely that people have be-
come homeless. 3 Although the debate has touched peripherally on
such laudable anti-poverty strategies as the Earned Income Tax
Credit (EITC) expansion,4 it has ignored the bigger ,issue of why
poverty continues to worsen despite the public assistance programs
already in place. In response to perceived public pressure, slogans
have replaced real solutions. "Three strikes and you're out ' 5 in the
criminal justice debate has mutated to "TWo years and you're off"6
in the welfare debate.7
3. "General Assistance" refers to state and local public assistance programs that
provide cash or in-kind benefits to needy individuals who are generally ineligible for
federal public assistance programs. Not all states operate a GA program. These pro-
grams are often the only viable option for single, childless unemployed adults who are
not eligible for federal programs. Some states and localities refer to these programs
as "General Relief" or "Home Relief," but this Essay will use the term General
Assistance to refer to all such non-federal public assistance programs.
4. The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) is a tax benefit for working people
who earn low or moderate incomes. 26 U.S.C. § 32 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). It is the
single most effective program today to "make work pay" so that welfare recipients are
encouraged to become employed. This year it will be extended to adults with no
children, although their benefits are extremely limited. 26 U.S.C. § 32 (c)(1). Regret-
tably, some new Congressional leaders want to cut back the program. See, e.g., 141
CONG. REC. S3385 (daily ed. Mar. 2, 1995)(statement of Sen. Nickles, characterizing
the current rates of EITC eligibility in the District of Columbia as "absurd").
5. See, e.g., 141 CONG. REC. S2838 (daily ed. Feb. 16, 1995)(legislative day Jan.
30, 1995)(statement of Sen. Snowe, applying the phrase to recommend that third time
violent offenders receive mandatory life imprisonment terms). This term leapt to
public consciousness in 1994 in California with the passage of legislation imposing
severe sentencing guidelines for those convicted of a third felony.
6. See, e.g., 140 CONG. REC. H2164 (daily ed. Mar. 24, 1994)(statement of Rep.
Owens, recommending that the "two year" limit should apply to all government
subsidies).
7. The national media plays a significant role in fueling hostility towards welfare
recipients. ABC's Prime Time addressed AFDC fraud in September, 1993: an inves-
tigator estimated that 50% of AFDC recipients were cheating! ABC Prime Time
Live: Welfare Fraud (ABC television broadcast, Sept. 17, 1992), available in LEXIS,
News Lib." Script File. No other estimates were provided and ABC never responded
to a request to present a different view. In January, 1995 ABC broadcast a similar
program on Food Stamp fraud. ABC Prime Time Live: A Second Currency (ABC
television broadcast, Jan. 11, 1995), available in LEXIS, News Lib., Script File, Trans.
No. 384. Official government fraud figures are much lower. California estimated er-
rors in only 9.4% of cases, including non-fraudulent situations such as welfare depart-
ment mistakes and honest client errors. STATE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES,
AFDC QUALITY CONTROL CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN: OCTOBER 1990-SEPTEMBER
1991, cited in MCKEEVER, THE SONG REMAINS THE SAME: RESELLING PROPOSITION
165 34-35 (1993). The same study estimated underpayments in 4.2% of all cases.
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All attempts at welfare reform will fail unless they result from a
comprehensive understanding of why people are poor.8 Aside
from the inadequacy of benefits,9 poverty also results from the lack
of available jobs, particularly full-time jobs paying above the fed-
eral poverty line. Hysterical claims about welfare recipients refus-
ing to look for work and preferring AFDC should be tempered by
several ignored realities. :
First, the Federal Reserve Board asserts that at least 6% of the
workforce must be unemployed at any given time to prevent infla-
tionary wage pressure from overheating the economy.10 This TUR,
which the Federal Reserve Bank considers the minimum unem-
ployment rate that would have no adverse effect on the national
inflation rate, is known by some economists as the "nonaccelerat-
ing inflation rate of unemployment" or the "natural unemployment
rate.""
The TUR, as defined above,' 2 however, underestimates the Hid-
den Unemployment Rate by about one half. 3 In Other words, be-
8. This Essay will not discuss other ignored causes of poverty. For example,
while 14.5% of Americans live below the federal poverty level, the households which
are the richest 5% now control nearly a fifth of all the national wealth, according to
Census Bureau figures released in 1994. This disparity has been increasing since the
early 1980s, in large part due to tax cuts. As of 1992, one policy group found that the
total cost of this redistribution of wealth, including the $84 billion tax cut enjoyed by
the one million richest families plus the $81 billion in interest the government would
pay because of those tax cuts, equaled nearly the entire annual federal budget deficit.
ROBERT MCINTYRE, CITIZENS FOR TAX JUSTICE, INEQUALITY AND THE FEDERAL
BUDGET DEFICIT 8 (1991).
9. The United States lags far behind all other members of the Organization of
Economically Developed Countries (OEDC) in terms of the effectiveness of govern-
ment anti-poverty intervention strategies. A 1991 study of seven Western industrial
nations revealed that at least 75% of poor families were lifted out of poverty in the
Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom, compared to 50% in France; 33 1/3%
in West Germany, 20% in Canada and only 4.5% in the U.S. CENTER ON HUNGER,
POVERTY AND NUTRITION POLICY, STATEMENT ON KEY WELFARE REFORM ISSUES
18 (1995)(citing K. McFATE, ET AL., JOINT CENTER FOR POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC
STUDIES, POVERTY INEQUALITY AND THE CRISIS OF SOCIAL POLICY: SUMMARY OF
FINDINGS (1991)).
10. James Risen, Fed Economists Become Nervous When Unemployment Figures
Fall, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 29, 1994, at Al. The Total Unemployment rate (TUR) is, as its
name implies, the total number of all unemployed workers relative to the entire work
force. In January, 1995, the rate rose to 5.7% (8.2% -in California), thanks to the
seventh hike on the interest rate by the Federal Reserve Bank in the past year. See
Patricia Moore, State Jobless At 20-Yr. Low; Economists See New Interest Rate Hike,
CHI. SUN-TIMES, Jan. 7, 1995, at 1.
11. Robert J. Samuelson, Alan Knows Best?, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 21, 1994, at 63.
12. See supra note 10.
13. DAVID DEMBO & WARD MOREHOUSE, COUNCIL ON INTERNATIONAL AND
PUBLIC AFFAIRS, THE UNDERBELLY OF THE U.S; ECONOMY: JOBLESSNESS AND THE
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cause Federal Reserve Bank considers a stable TUR to be roughly
6%, our economic system today requires that approximately 12%
of the entire workforce, or one in eight workers, be effectively un-
employed.14 A recent San Francisco Examiner headline, declaring,
"Jobless rise sends markets soaring," dramatically illustrates the
degree to which Wall Street considers higher unemployment eco-
nomically beneficial. 15
Second, the percentage of unemployed persons who receive un-
employment compensation has dropped dramatically. The New
Deal social compact that led to passage of the 1935 Social Security
Act 16 guaranteed that unemployed workers be entitled to Unem-
ployment Insurance Benefits. As the memory fades of how close
the Nation came to social revolution when millions were unem-
ployed and totally destitute, so too does this national commitment.
The consequence of these (and many other) gaping holes in the
UI safety net is that many ineligible workers have no choice but to
apply for welfare. Others who do receive UI must often also rely
on welfare benefits because the UI level is so low for low-wage
workers. Increasingly restrictive UI eligibility rules exclude the
sector of the economy that is expanding relative to other groups:
PAUPERIZATION OF WORK IN: AMERICA 41-43 (1994). The Hidden Unemployment
Rate accounts for segments of unemployment that the TUR ignores, such as persons
who work part-time but would prefer full-time work, persons who have become dis-
couraged from looking for work because they believe none currently exists and the
broader, more general category of persons who want jobs but do not have them. Id.
at 43. Appendix A lists data of the Bureau of Labor Statistics that break down the
different elements of unemployment that account for the difference between the TUR
and the Hidden Unemployment Rate.
14. Unemployment of minorities has been historically double that of whites, even
higher in inner cities. The National Urban League estimated in its 1993 report, State
of Black America, that in 1991, when the overall TUR was between 6-7%, the TUR
for African-Americans was 12.4% and the Hidden Unemployment Rate for African-
Americans was 23.1%. NATIONAL URBAN LEAGUE, STATE OF BLACK AMERICA
(1994). If a TUR of 6% is considered today to be the lowest TUR the Federal Re-
serve will permit, meaning a 12% overall hidden unemployment rate and a hidden
unemployment rate of 24% for African-Americans, the inescapable conclusion is that
at least one-quarter of all employable African-Americans will be unemployed at all
times. Lesser unemployment will mean that the overall TUR has fallen too low. In
response, the Federal Reserve will raise interest rates to prevent overheating of the
economy, thus causing a rise in unemployment rates. For California, which has suf-
fered unemployment rates that are consistently higher than the national figures dur-
ing this past recession, the calculations are worse: with California's TUR at 8.2% at
the time of the last of seven upward adjustments to the interest rate, approximately
one-third of all African-Americans in California were unemployed.
15. Jobless Rise Sends Markets Soaring, S.F. EXAMINER, Feb. 3, 1995 at Al.
16. Social Security Act, ch. 531, 49 Stat. 620 (1935)(current version at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 301-1397(0(1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
CONTINGENT WORKERS
the contingent and part-time work force. Women and people of
color form a disproportionate share of this segment of the work
force. 1
7
National policymakers ignore these truths. Instead, political
rhetoric blames the poor for their unemployment and demands
that they be weaned from welfare and told to find nonexistent
jobs. 8 While the welfare debate has stalled on behavior modifica-
tion strategies 19 and queries whether the federal government
should play any anti-poverty role at all, productive debate on de-
veloping a national anti-poverty strategy involving both the private
and public sectors has been stifled.
The goal of welfare reform should be not to reduce the availabil-
ity of AFDC-or any other income maintenance entitlement pro-
gram-to those who must rely on it. Rather, reform efforts should
attempt to reduce the need for such programs through the develop-
ment of different anti-poverty tools.
17. Although women comprise 45% of the labor force, they constitute a full 67%
of part-time workers. U.S. BUREAU OF CENSUS, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS,
SERIES P-60, No. 175, POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1990. Additionally, African-
Americans are 1.7 times as likely as white workers to hold part-time jobs involunta-
rily. NATIONAL EMPLOYMENT LAW PROJECT, BRIEFING BOOK: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
LABOR OVERSIGHT AND REFORM OF THE UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION PRO-
GRAM, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 4 (1994)(citing Chris Tily, Short Hours, Short Shrift:
the Causes and Consequences of Part-Time Employment, in NEW POLICIES FOR THE
PART-TIME AND CONTINGENT WORKFORCE, 15, 19 (Virginia duRivage ed., 1992)).
African-Americans hold 20.2% of all temporary jobs, although they comprise only
10.4% of the workforce. Id. (citing Francoise J. Carre, Temporary Employment in the
Eighties, in NEW POLICIES FOR THE PART-TIME AND CONTINGENT WORKFORCE,
supra, at 50); see also id. at 4.
18. When a report was issued that noted that one in six Californians were hungry,
a spokesperson for Governor Pete Wilson said: "What's causing people to go hungry
is that they're not working .... People are going to continue to live in poverty unless
they make some attempt to enter the work force." Yumi Wilson, One in Six Californi-
ans Go Hungry, Report Says, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., Apr. 7, 1995, at Al.
19. Personal Responsibility Act, H.R. 4, Tit. I, § 100, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1995)("It is the sense of the Congress that.., in light of ... the crisis in our nation,
the reduction of out-of-wedlock births is an important government interest and the
policy contained in provisions of this title address[sic] the crisis.").
Professor Lawrence Mead has characterized the welfare system as a potential asset,
because it gives the government leverage over the lifestyles of the poor. See generally
LAWRENCE MEAD, THE NEW POLITICS OF POVERTY: THE NONWORKING POOR IN
AMERICA (1992). Republican Governors who want block grants with no strings at-
tached currently find themselves opposed by Congressional leaders who want to en-
sure control over the use of federal money, for example denying it to teenage
mothers. See, e.g., Phil Willon, Block Grants May Pose Problems for State, TAMPA
TRIB., Apr. 4, 1995, at 6 (predicting Florida's likely inability to control public assist-
ance programs if block grant system with strings attached is implemented).
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This Essay examines the manner in which our current system of
unemployment insurance maintains poverty and often increases
dependence on public assistance programs at a time when those
programs are weakening. Part II examines (i) the current plight of
the working poor, detailing how low wage earners must resort to
welfare when they lose their jobs and sometimes even while work-
ing; (ii) the inadequacy of the unemployment compensation sys-
tem; and (iii) the failure of welfare programs to compensate for the
weaknesses of that system. Part III proposes reforms to the unem-
ployment compensation system. Part IV proposes a new system
that would help employable persons with inadequate ties to the
workforce to qualify for "unemployment assistance" benefits. Part
V explains why the proposed system makes sense in light of the
current unemployment situation.
II. The Crisis of the Working Poor
The current debate ignores the plight of the working poor, per-
sons who struggle to maintain a job, yet do not earn enough to
survive or work long enough to develop a stable work history. This
Part discredits the myth of the lazy AFDC recipient and explains
that one solution for many AFDC recipients in addition to more
jobs, would be more unemployment compensation.
A. Those in Poverty Work But Remain Poor
Millions who work full-time at the minimum wage remain
poor.20 The current $4.25 minimum wage is nearly $1.75 below
what it would be had the 1975 level been adjusted for inflation.
In fact, the real value of the minimum wage is now at its second
lowest level since 1955.22 For minimum wage workers without
20. One out of every seven members of our population live below the federal
poverty level and many more persons are poor. Experts argue that the federal pov-
erty level, calculated by tripling the amount supposedly needed to buy food is too low
because it is based on a false premise about the relative cost of today's necessities,
particularly rent. See Maggie Spade, Poverty Measures Mask the Depth of Poverty in
America, 28 CLEARINGH4OUSE REV. 517, 518-19 (1994). For 1993-94, the poverty level
was under $1000 a month for a family of three.
21. ISAAC SHAPIRO, CENTER ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, ASSESSING A
$5.15 MINIMUM WAGE 3 (1995). The minimum wage would have to be $5.93 an hour
to have the same purchasing power it had in the 1970s. Id.
22. CENTER ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES, FOUR YEARS AND STILL FALL-
ING: THE DECLINE IN THE VALUE OF THE MINIMUM WAGE (1995). According to this
study, over thirteen million workers had wages below the average state minimum
wage in the 1970s, which in 1995 dollars would equal $5.42. According to the U.S.
Bureau of Labor Statistics, hourly wages declined 13.6% between 1973 and 1993.
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health insurance, complete destitution is only an illness away. For
single parents, that disaster is almost inevitable, because rent and
childcare can absorb an entire paycheck, leaving nothing for any
other expenses.2 3
The misinformed public would be surprised to learn that AFDC
parents are typically part of the labor force. Nearly three-quarters
of AFDC recipients have recent work experience and less than a
third continue to receive AFDC for as long as twenty-four
months.24 They often receive AFDC benefits while they work be-
cause they earn extremely low wages, and frequently work part-
time. Over one quarter of the new jobs created in the March 1991-
July 1993 recovery period were part-time; 75% of those jobs were
filled involuntarily by people who would have preferred full-time
work.2 5 Other AFDC recipients are laid-off workers who fail to
meet the earnings threshold for Unemployment Compensation and
must therefore fall back entirely on AFDC until they find new em-
ployment, Because of the high frequency of lay-off from low-wage
jobs, people often move in and out of the workforce, never ac-
cumulating a work history sufficient to entitle them to UI benefits.
B. Unemployment Compensation Does Not Protect the
Working Poor
As previously discussed, the working poor regularly resort to the
welfare system when they become unemployed because they are
typically ineligible for UI. The Unemployment Compensation sys-
tem has deteriorated so severely over the past several decades that
it now fails to protect a large percentage of workers in times of
unemployment.
The ratio of the Insured Unemployment Rate to Total Unem-
ployment Rate (IUR/TUR) has declined approximately 60% since
1947.26 Today, less than 40% of the unemployed nationwide re-
CENTER ON HUNGER, POVERTY AND NUTRITION POLICY, STATEMENT ON KEY WEL-
FARE REFORM ISSUES 14-15 (1995).
23. A study of Boston housing expenditures showed that the majority of house-
holds with incomes of $5,000 spend 70% or more of their total income on housing
costs. Spade, supra note 20, at 518. A similar study indicated that poor families spend
23% of their income on child care. Id. at 519.
24. CENTER ON SOCIAL WELFARE POLICY AND LAW, WHAT'S WRONG WITH
TIME-LIMITING AFDC? 2 (1994)(citations omitted).
25. CENTER FOR LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY, Low WAGES, FAMILY MATTERS 3, 5
(Fall, 1994).
26. ACUC STAFF BRIEFING PAPER, STATE TRUST FUND SOLVENCY 3.
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ceive UI.2 The rate of UI coverage among the working poor pop-
ulation that ends up surviving on AFDC benefits is significantly
lower than the national average.28 Eighty-nine percent of women
whose income included both wages and AFDC upon losing their
jobs were ineligible to receive UI, despite working an average of
910 hours per year.29 Over three quarters of those not eligible for
UI worked at least twenty-five weeks over the studied two-year
period.3 O
Among the most important reasons that so few unemployed
workers receive benefits are the various ways that federal and state
law restrict UI eligibility.31 First, federal law excludes certain types
of workers, such as those who are self-employed, regardless of the
amount of money they earn or the length of time that they work.
Federal law permits states to exclude other categories as well.
States may exclude agricultural workers, domestic workers, in-
dependent contractors and casual workers. As a consequence, ap-
proximately 12% of the work force works in employment not
covered by unemployment compensation. 32 Additionally, these ex-
clusions provide employers with the opportunity to misclassify
workers as independent contractors or consultants to avoid UI
27. The United States does not compare favorably with other nations in the
Group of Seven. In 1985, when the U.S. IU/TU rate was only 34%, comparable
figures for other nations were much higher: Canada, 80%; France 72%; Germany
68%; Italy, 60%; and the UK, 90%. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, 102D
CONG., 2D SESS., REPORT ON UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION IN THE GROUP OF
SEVEN NATIONS: AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON 19 (Joint Comm. Print
1992)[hereinafter G-7 REPORT]. Receipt of unemployment benefits in the United
States has reached record lows in recent months, as just 32.5% of unemployed work-
ers received benefits during the last eight months of 1994. Associated Press, Fewer
Workers Are Collecting Unemployment; Report Attributes Trend to Shift in Labor
Market, S.F. CHRON., May 15, 1995, at A5.
28. ROBERTA SPALTER-ROTH, ET AL., INSTITUTE FOR WOMEN'S POLICY RE-
SEARCH, INCOME INSECURITY: THE FAILURE OF UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE TO
REACH OUT TO WORKING AFDC MOTHERS 2 (1994).
29. Id. at 2. The Institute for Women's Policy Research refers to these women as
"work/welfare packagers." Id. The 11% who actually received UI worked an average
of 1050 hours per year. Id.
30. Id. The Institute found that these non-UI recipients averaged 2200 hours of
work in sixty-nine weeks. Many of these workers worked more hours in more weeks
than those receiving UI, but worked fewer hours per week. Id. For further discus-
sion, see infra note 35.
31. In 1988, the U.S. General Accounting Office estimated that between 1981 and.
1987 forty-four states had restricted eligibility. RICHARD W. McHUGH, WHY Do
FEWER OF THE UNEMPLOYED RECEIVE UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE BENEFITS? 3
(1991)(on file with the Fordham Urban Law Journal).
32. VIRGINIA L. DuRIVAGE, ECONOMIC POLICY INSTITUTE, NEW POLICIES FOR
THE PART-TIME AND CONTINGENT WORKFORCE 18 (Nov. 1991).
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CoStS. 33 Various states have considered legislation that would pro-
hibit this practice but to date, no such legislation has passed. 34
States have also limited eligibility to UI by imposing restrictions
based on earnings levels and workforce connection requirements.
These requirements base eligibility upon a combination of total
earnings and amount of time in the workforce. 35 The earnings tests
in at least half of the states would disqualify an average part-time
worker.36 A worker's ability to satisfy these tests is further limited
by the "lag quarter" rule. Under this rule, neither income earned
in the calendar quarter within which one is applying, nor that
earned in the immediately preceding calendar quarter, is counted
in determining UI eligibility. For instance, a Californian applying
on June 29 would have all earnings in the April-June quarter ex-
cluded from consideration, as well as all money earned in the lag
quarter, January-March, a total of six months of earnings.37 The
33. Virginia duRivage cites to a 1989 IRS estimate that 38% of employers misclas-
sify employees to avoid unemployment compensation taxes as well as Social Security
and workers' compensation obligations. Id,
34. GAO REPORT supra note 2, at 39 (discussing attempts by California and Colo-
rado to curb misclassification); see also Misclassification of Employees As Independent
Contractors, Public Testimony Before the House Comm. on Small Business, 104th
Cong., 1st Sess., available in WESTLAW, USTESTIMONY Library, 1995 WL 20780
(Fed. Doc. Clearinghouse)(statement of Ronald Baker, President, Building Service
Contractors Association International)(urging Congress to pass new legislation that
would prevent employers from evading taxes by misclassifying workers).
35. These requirements typically are stated in terms of dollars earned in a one-
year base period. See e.g., CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 1281(a)(3)(West 1986)(defining
base period). California, for example, has a complicated formula requiring a worker
claiming benefits after Jan. 1, 1992 to have either earned $1,300 during at least one
quarter of the "base period" or $900 for one such quarter if total wages during the
base period are at least 1.25 times that amount. Id. at § 1281(a)(3)(A)-(B)(West
Supp. 1995). Such a formula necessarily disadvantages low-wage workers who must
work more hours to reach the dollar minimum. A low-wage worker might actually
work more weeks in the base period than a higher paid worker who qualifies for
benefits, but be ineligible because he had not earned enough to meet the dollar
threshold.
36. DuRiVAGE, supra note 32, at 106. Some low-wage employers frequently ma-
nipulate workers' hours so as to ensure that they will not qualify for benefits when
laid off. GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at 38-39. Employers are often motivated to
prevent employees from becoming eligible for UI, because the percentage of payroll
that must be paid into the employer trust fund under an "experience-rated tax" sys-
tem is determined by the dollar amount drawn out of that fund through payment of
UI to former employees. Experience-rated taxing also causes employers to systemati-
cally contest applications for benefits, frequently by falsely claiming that a worker
quit or was discharged for misconduct.
37. CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 1275; see also ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 820, para. 405/237
(Smith-Hurd 1993). Illinois' use of this practice was recently held suspect in Pen-
nington v. Ward, 1992 WL 535529 (N.D. Ill., Oct. 21, 1992), rev'd sub nom, Pen-
nington v. Didrickson, 22 F.3d 1376 (7th Cir. 1994), cert. denied sub nom, Doherty v.
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original justification for the lag quarter rule was that it was not
possible to process a worker's hour and wage information from the
most recent quarter quickly enough to include it in eligibility calcu-
lations. Today, however, that justification is no longer valid on ac-
count of advances in information technology.3 8
A third mechanism states apply in order to disqualify applicants
is the "voluntary quit" rule. States generally define "voluntary"
broadly. In 1993, for example, only nine states did not define vol-
untary to include quitting a job because of sexual harassment.39
Additionally, most states define voluntary to include leaving be-
cause of family or medical emergencies. 40 Also, many states con-
sider that leaving work because of an emergency child care
problem is a voluntary quit.4'
A fourth limitation on UI eligibility is the "able and available to
work" requirement. Forty-four states maintain these requirements,
which disqualify workers who are looking only for part-time
work.42 This disqualification applies regardless of the applicant's
previous work history and is particularly harmful to permanently
employed part-time workers. 43 It ignores the importance of part-
time workers to the economy, both from the standpoint of persons
such as working mothers who cannot work full-time, and from the
standpoint of small businesses who need part-time workers to fill
their varying needs."
A final way that states limit eligibility is through "durational dis-
qualification." As discussed above, states have always penalized
workers who have been discharged for misconduct, those who have
Pennington, 115 S. Ct. 613 (1994). The case was remanded with instructions for fur-
ther factual findings and a determination as to whether use of the lag quarter rule
results in timely payment of benefits. Illinois must now look to more recent earnings
if use of the lag quarter rule' leaves a claimant without benefits.
38. The Reemployment Act of 1994, Testimony on H.R. 4040 Before the Subcomm.
on Human Resources and Trade of the House Comm. of Ways and Means, 103d Cong.,
2d Sess., available in WESTLAW, USTESTIMONY Library, 1994 WL 377918, at 6
(Fed. Doc. Clearinghouse)(statement of Fran Bernstein, Legislative Advocate on-Be-
half of the National Employment Law Project).
39. Memorandum from Diana M. Pearce, Director,' Women and Poverty Project,
to the National Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation 2 (May 11,
1993)(on file with the Fordham Urban Law Journal). Pearce notes that about thirty
states have provided various forms of limited protection through case law. Id
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. BRIEFING BOOK, supra note 19, at 3.
43. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION, UNEMPLOY-




left a job voluntarily and those who have refused suitable work.
Originally, these penalties would disqualify such persons from UI
for a fixed number of weeks. Today, however, most states disqual-
ify affected persons until they work again for enough time and
earnings to reestablish a connection to the workforce.4 5 For in-
stance, in South Dakota, a disqualified claimant must work six
weeks and earn wages equal to or greater than his or her weekly
benefit amount in each of those weeks before he can be eligible for
UI benefits again.46 Persons disqualified under these provisions
have no alternative but to turn to welfare.47
The above restrictions affect those in poverty most profoundly.
On account of such restrictions, those living under the federal pov-
erty index form one-third of the unemployed, but they form only
one-fifth of those receiving U1 benefits.4
C. Welfare-When Available-Is an Inadequate Substitute for
UI
For the many reasons set out above, millions of those who lose
their jobs find themselves without any UI benefits.49 Those with
children become eligible for AFDC. Those who are single must
rely on county or state-funded General Assistance, if it exists.
Seven southern or border states have no GA program at all, while
45. ADVISORY COUNCIL ON UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION, UNEMPLOYMENT
INSURANCE IN THE UNITED STATES: BENEFITS, FINANCING, COVERAGE 111 (1995).
The history of California Unemployment Insurance Code § 1260 is illustrative of this
trend. As originally drafted, the disqualification period was four weeks. Act of 1953,
ch. 1294, 1953 Cal. Stat. 2854. It increased to nine weeks in 1955, Act of 1955, ch. 899,
§ 3, 1955 Cal. Stat. 1526, and to ten weeks in 1961. Act of 1961, ch. 1924, § 1, 1961
Cal. Stat. 4042. In 1965, the law was amended to adopt the durational disqualification
concept. Act of 1965, ch. 1897, § 12, 1965 Cal. Stat. 4377.
46. RICHARD McHUGH, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SOCIAL INSURANCE, WHY DO
FEWER OF THE UNEMPLOYED RECEIVE UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE BENEFITS? AN
INITIAL EXAMINATION OF STATE RESTRICTIONS 7 (1991). The South Dakota pro-
gram is known colloquially as a "6 x 6" disqualification. Indiana imposes a similar
policy that requires that a disqualified claimant work eight weeks at his weekly bene-
fit amount, known as an "8 x 8" plan. Id. at 7-8. Florida adjusts the duration of its
penalties, ranging from 17 x 17 for voluntary quits to 52 x 52 for misconduct dis-
charges. Id. at 8.
47. Because welfare benefits are always means-tested, a person must spend down
savings before applying. The benefit itself is so much lower than average earnings
that many workers must find cheaper housing, which puts additional pressure on the
limited low-income housing market.
48. DuRIVAGE, supra note 32, at 20.
49. Those working in covered employment, however, had both federal and state
unemployment taxes paid on their behalf by their employers, even though more than
half of those who lost their jobs did not qualify for UI. Taxes paid on their behalf
enabled the Trust Fund to pay benefits to those who did qualify for Ul.
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sixteen other states either provide no aid to able-bodied adults or
have severely restricted it in the past few years.50 All GA pro-
grams exclude anyone eligible for UI benefits. Cuts to GA pro-
grams often leave persons destitute who have been laid off and
who are either ineligible for UI benefits or have exhausted those
benefits.
Virtually no one has expressed concern nationally over the harsh
effect that GA cutbacks have had on unemployed single adults.51
This neglect is particularly striking given that members of this pop-
ulation form a large percentage of the estimated three million per-
sons who live on our streets. Urban homelessness has become a
critical political issue, one that has motivated state and local gov-
ernments to spend millions of dollars to criminalize homelessness,
while taking little action to ensure a survival income so that these
people can live indoors.52
Trends to reduce or eliminate GA and AFDC benefits are dra-
matically increasing homelessness. California's current Legislature
considered legislation that would have permitted counties to limit
GA eligibility to only three months per year,53 and Governor Pete
50. The following states have no GA program at all: Alabama, Arkansas, Louisi-
ana, Mississippi, Oklahoma, Tennessee and West Virginia. Delaware, Hawaii, New
Mexico, Rhode Island, Utah, Wyoming, Michigan, Ohio, Illinois, District of Colum-
bia, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Pennsylvania and several Virginia counties have all
restricted or time-limited their GA programs by excluding persons labelled "employ-
able." CENTER ON SOCIAL WELFARE POLICY AND LAW, JOBLESS, PENNILESS, OFTEN
HOMELESS: STATE GENERAL ASSISTANCE CuTS LEAVE "EMPLOYABLES" STRUG-
GLING FOR SURVIVAL, PuB. No. 805, EXEC. SUMM. 2, nn2-3 (1994) [hereinafter JoB-
LESS, PENNILESS]. Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia,
Maine, New York, North Dakota, Oregon, South Carolina, Vermont and Washington
all restrict the eligibility of "able-bodied" adults. Id. Some of these states, such as
California, have state-mandated GA programs that are created and run at the county
level, resulting in wide variations in eligibility criteria and benefit levels.
51. Assistant Secretary of Health and Human Services David Ellwood, chairing
the President's Welfare Reform Working Group hearing in Sacramento, California in
October, 1993, admitted to this writer at that hearing that the Working Group "had
no mandate" from the President to look at welfare benefits for single adults.
52. San Francisco's current Mayor, former Police Chief Frank Jordan, was elected
in large part because of his promises to sweep homeless people off the street. His
Matrix program has succeeded only in driving them to other, less frequented parts of
the city. See John King, San Francisco Supervisors Blast Homeless Crackdown; Jordan
Urged to Step Away from Matrix, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., Mar. 21, 1995, at A15
(reporting a resolution adopted by the Board of Supervisors which referred to the
plan as "cruel and unusual punishment").
53. A.B. 9, Cal. 1995-96, Reg. Sess. (1995), available in LEXIS, Codes Library.
Another bill, eventually rejected, would have simply repealed the State mandate upon
counties to provide relief and support under the state Welfare & Institutions Code.
A.B. 154, Cal. 1995-96, Reg. Sess. (1995), available in LEXIS, Codes Library.
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Wilson is seeking huge AFDC cuts for the fourth consecutive
year. 4 Other states are considering similar action."
As the political attitude hardens-"Those lazy people should get
a job!"-the reality of our nation's economy is ignored. The offi-
cially required 12% unemployment rate, 56 as well as the high rate
of unemployment in inner city communities,5 7 are rarely men-
tioned in the current "welfare to work" rhetoric. The ostensible
purpose of draconian welfare cuts is to wean this population from
the welfare bottle and into employment. The results-continued
unemployment and utter destitution-should surprise no one.
States that have limited or discontinued their GA programs ex-
emplify these results. In Michigan, over 80% of formerly employ-
able GA recipients did not work for most of the year following that
state's termination of its GA program.5 8 Twenty-five percent re-
ported being homeless within seven months, 27,000 of whom went
without food for twenty-four hours or more. Thirteen percent be-
gan receiving Supplemental Security Income (SSI) 59 within two
years.60  In Pennsylvania, nearly two-thirds of persons who had
54. His "May Revise" 1995-96 budget would cut AFDC by 25% in September,
1995. These cuts are in addition to a total of 12.9%.in.cuts from 1991-94. See Robert
B. Gunnison, Wilson Revives Plan to Cut Welfare. Along with Slashing Benefits, He
Suggests "Mini-Orphanages," SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., Jan. 9, 1995, at Al (recount-
ing Governor Wilson's intent to seek sharp welfare reductions); see also Virginia Ellis,
California Elections; Proposition 165; Welfare Measure That Boosts Governor's Power
Sparks Costly War, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 15, 1992, at A3 (discussing a previous attempt by
Governor Wilson to reduce welfare expenditures).
55. See, e.g., Wayne Slater, Senate Budget Endorsed; $80.2 Billion Proposal Is Sent
to Full Chamber, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Mar. 31, 1995, at 27A (describing human
services cuts in proposed Texas budget); Editorial, The State Budget Standoff, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 8, 1995, at 22 (commenting on the ugliness of the New York budget bat-
tie); John Sanko, Colorado Budget Breaks $8 Billion. Senate Will Send to House Next
Week; Education Still Leads, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Mar. 28, 1995, at 8A (noting
AFDC cuts in new Colorado state budget, its largest ever).
56. See supra notes 10-14 and accompanying text.
57. In many inner city communities, the TUR is over 50%. See supra note 14 and
accompanying text.
58. JOBLESS, PENNILESS, supra note 29, at 4.
59. Congress enacted the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program in 1972 to
assist "individuals who have attained age 65 or are blind or disabled" by setting a
guaranteed minimum income level for such persons if their income and financial re-
sources are below a certain level. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-85 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
60. JOBLESS, PENNILESS, supra note 27, at 6. A recent study of 638 homeless
adults with no physical or mental impairment at the onset of homelessness revealed
that within a year, 9.3% had problems with excessive alcohol use, 4.4% used illegal
drugs and 0.9% had experienced some psychiatric hospitalization. Those figures more
than doubled for those who had been homeless for more than one year but less than
five years and approximately doubled again for those homeless for more than five
years. Marilyn A. Winkleby & Randall White, Homeless Adults Without Apparent
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been removed from the GA program remained unemployed for at
least six months during the two years following GA termination.
One-third of those persons reported that health problems pre-
vented them from working.6'
The fiscal absurdity of such human tragedy is apparent. As peo-
ple become homeless, they become less and less able to work ever
again; homelessness leads over time to alcohol and substance abuse
and mental disabilities.62 The costs soar: hospital emergency rooms
fill with patients with TB and other costly illnesses which modern
society was on the verge of eradicating.63 Additionally, the federal
government spends billions funding housing and shelter assistance
programs for those with an inadequate income stream to pay for
rent.
III. Reforms Are Needed for the Tattered Unemployment
Compensation System
Federal and state changes in the unemployment compensation
system would significantly improve its ability to help the unem-
ployed, and thereby reduce dependency on welfare and housing
programs. Such a shift in strategy is politically urgent in today's
climate of welfare-bashing. It would go far in reducing the number
of people forced to survive on meager welfare benefits, thereby
making continued benefits to the unemployable AFDC population
more acceptable politically.64 The public, frustrated with the per-
ception that employable persons are responsible for burgeoning
welfare rolls, would likely be more willing to support adequate un-
employment benefits. Someone receiving UI is not "on the dole."
Rather, the UI recipient is receiving money deducted from his pay
Medical and Psychiatric Impairment: Onset of Morbidity Over Time, 43 HOSPITAL
AND COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 1017, 1020 t.4 (1992).
61. JOBLESS, PENNILESS, supra note 29, at 5.
62. See Winkleby & White, supra note 36.
63. Ironically, those calling for tax cuts are those most responsible for ensuring
that ultimately the taxpayer will pay many times more in downstream costs than
would have been necessary had preventative, supportive programs been fully funded.
For example, a state-financed study showed a $7 savings for every $1 of California
taxes spent on drug treatment. Sheryl Stolberg, Study Shows Drug Abuse Programs
Are Cost Effective, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 29, 1994, at Al. Many studies have shown at
least a 3:1 dollar benefit from prenatal care programs. Leslie Laurence, Health Pro-
fessionals Examine Value of Preventive Strategies, Hous. CHRON., Sept. 21, 1994, at 2.
64. Today's welfare reform debate ignores the special needs of unemployable
AFDC recipients. Governor Wilson's attempt at reforming welfare by cutting bene-
fits across the board, ostensibly to increase the earnings disregard, was held illegal by
a California court, in large part because unemployable recipient's benefits were also
cut. Beno v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 1994).
CONTINGENT WORKERS
under the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA) 65, and is there-
fore receiving his due. 66
In February 1994, the Advisory Council on Unemployment
Compensation (ACUC) 67 made several important recommenda-
tions that would help repair the UI safety net.68 First, the Council
recommended that Congress eliminate the exemption of agricul-
tural workers on small farms from Unemployment Insurance cov-
erage.69 Second, the Council urged states to adopt a "movable
base period" to eliminate the harsh effects of the "lag quarter"
rule.70 Under the moveable base approach, when a claimant has
not earned sufficient wages during four of, the five previous
quarters that are used to determine eligibility, the state would reas-
sess the claim based on wages earned in the fifth or "lag" quarter.7'
Additionally, the Council directed that states should not set base
requirements any higher than 800 times the minimum wage,72 and
that they should eliminate seasonal exclusions73 and the practice of
denying benefits to workers who seek only part-time work.74 Fi-
nally, the Council urged that benefit levels be set that would re-
place at least 50% of lost earnings over a six-month period.75
65. Federal Unemployment Tax Act, 26 U.S.C. §§ 3301-11 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
66. This perception ignores that working AFDC and GA recipients also pay into
that fund and yet receive nothing in return after they lose their jobs.
67. Congress authorized the creation of the Advisory Council on Unemployment
Compensation in the Emergency Unemployment Compensation Act of 1991. Pub. L.
102-164, 105 Stat. 1049, amended by Pub. L. No. 102-182, 105 Stat. 1234 (1991); Pub.
L. No. 102-244, 106 Stat. 3,4 (1992); Pub. L. No. 102-318, 106 Stat. 290 (1992); Pub. L.
No. 103-6, 107 Stat. 33 (1993); Pub. L. No. 103-152, 107 Stat. 1516, 1517 (1993).
68. ADVISORY COUNCIL ON UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION, REPORT TO THE
PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS: UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE IN THE UNITED STATES:
BENEFITS, FINANCING AND COVERAGE (1995) [hereinafter ACUC REPORT]. These
and other changes had previously been proposed by the Employment Task Force of
the National Employment Law Project. See STATEMENT OF THE NATIONAL EMPLOY-
MENT LAW PROJECT, INC. TO THE ADVISORY COUNCIL ON UNEMPLOYMENT COMPEN-
SATION, PUBLIC MEETING 7-10 (1993). The National Commission on Unemployment
Compensation previously addressed these and other issues with courage in its 1980
report, Unemployment Compensation: Final Report.
69. ACUC REPORT, supra note 67, at 14.
70. Id. at 17. See also supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
71. Bernstein Testimony, supra note 52, at 6.
72. ACUC REPORT, supra note 67, at 18.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 20. "Wage replacement rate" generally refers to the percentage of prior
salary that is received in unemployment compensation benefits. Benefits are fre-
quently so low that recipients are eligible for supplemental welfare benefits. In 1990,
the wage replacement rate for UI benefits was less than 50% in all states and under
40% in all but sixteen states, all of which are Northern states. Interestingly, the
Southern tier of states, from which comes most of the new Republican majority in
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The Council also urged reform of the extended benefit system.
Extended benefits are intended to stabilize the economy in periods
of particularly long-term unemployment, by providing an addi-
tional thirteen weeks of benefits to persons who have exhausted
their basic twenty-six week grant of benefits without finding work.
The Council suggested that a new program should be developed
that would ensure that a significantly greater proportion of "ex-
haustees" of regular twenty-six week benefits become entitled to
extended benefits. Receipt of extended benefits is low because
currently, in order to offer extended benefits, a state's rate of un-
employment must exceed a certain level and must be worsening.
In 1981, the Omnibus Budget and Reconciliation Act raised the
unemployment level at which extended benefits would be trig-
gered.76 The new standard severely limited the ability of states to
offer extended benefits. 77 As a result, the formula used to deter-
mine when extended benefits would apply, qualifying states for the
50% matching federal share to pay extended benefits, was unre-
sponsive to high unemployment rates. Under that formula, only
eight states activated extended benefits during the 1991 recession.78
Although 1992 federal legislation offered states the option of re-
forming the state formula,79 few states did so. Instead, the states
pressured Congress, which passed the Emergency Unemployment
Compensation ("EUC") Act.80 Unfortunately, federal political
will was exhausted last year and the EUC program was not ex-
tended. The practice of setting extended benefit trigger points so
high, and thereby being forced to resort to EUC legislation, has
Congress, have comparatively weak UI state laws in terms of worker protection. See
GAO REPORT, supra note 3, chart at 50.
76. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. 97-35, tit. 24, §§ 2401-04, 95 Stat.
874-76 (1982).
77. Testimony on the First Report of the Advisory Council on Unemployment Com-
pensation Before the Subcomm. of Human Resources of the House Comm. on Ways
and Means, 103d Cong, 2d Sess. (1994), available in WESTLAW, USTESTIMONY
Library, 1994 WL 225724, at 6 (testimony of Richard W. McHugh, Associate General
Counsel, International Union, UAW).
78. ACUC REPORT, supra note 66, at 59.
79. Emergency Unemployment Compensation Act of 1991, Pub. L. 102-164, 105
Stat. 1049, amended by Pub. L. No. 102-182, 105 Stat. 1234 (1991); Pub. L. No. 102-
244, 106 Stat. 3, 4 (1992); Pub. L. No. 102-318, 106 Stat. 290 (1992); Pub. L. No. 103-6,
107 Stat. 33 (1993); Pub. L. No. 103-152, 107 Stat. 1516, 1517 (1993).
80. The EUC program was a federally funded insurance program enacted by Con-
gress in November, 1991 to deal with the long-term unemployment that resulted from
the recession occurring at that time. The program expired in October, 1993. It was
imposed as a stop-gap measure because unemployment levels were not high enough
to trigger the EB program.
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been more costly and less effective economically as a counter-cycli-
cal tool than a more easily-triggered EB system would have been.
Congress spent approximately 40% more on emergency unemploy-
ment benefits between 1.991 and 1994 than it would have spent on a
more comprehensive extended benefit program.8 '
The cost of limiting extended benefits so strictly is high. The
Center on, Budget Policies and Priorities (CBPP) has noted that
during the height of the 1993 California recession, the long-term
unemployed constituted 25% of the total unemployment rate, re-
sulting in approximately 50,000 California workers per month who
exhausted their regular UI benefits without finding work.82 In a
state that lost nearly 800,000 jobs in the early 1990s, many of those
workers have not been reemployed and must rely on welfare
instead.
In order to pay for these reforms,' the solvency of state trust
funds must be strengthened. The extension of UI benefits and the
liberalization of eligibility is inextricably linked to the issue of the
solvency of state UI trust funds.8 3 In 1993, the GAO concluded
that declining trust fund solvency levels contributed to lower UI
recipiency rates by providing the rationale for money-saving re-
strictive changes in UI laws affecting UI benefit eligibility and
wage replacement rates.84
.A major reason for trust fund solvency problems is that employ-
ers pay a smaller and smaller percentage of wages into the funds.
At the inception of the Unemployment Compensation program in
-1935, the taxable wage base was 100% of payrolls. That percentage
has fallen since then because legislation has capped the amount of
81. McHugh Testimony, supra note 77 at 7 ("Let me repeat. If a reformed EB
program had been place between January 1990 and August 1993, the Advisory Coun-
cil estimates its cost [would have been] at most $14 billion. With no effective EB
program in place, Congress adopted a less-targeted and mostly federally funded EUC
program to assist the long term unemployed which [sic] cost over $23 billion over this
time period. Overall, EUC outlays for the length of the program will reach $30
billion.").
82. IRIS J. LAV & JAMES R. ST. GEORGE, CENTER ON BUDGET POLICIES AND
PRIORITIES, END OF THE LINE FOR CALIFORNIA'S UNEMPLOYED? WHAT THE END OF
EMERGENCY UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS MEANS 10 (1993) (on file with the Fordham
Urban Law Journal).
83. The Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA) finances administrative costs,
half of Extended Benefits and loans to states experiencing insolvencies in their ac-
counts. States' tax revenues are credited to their individual accounts in the Unem-
ployment Trust Fund and pay all of ordinary 26-week benefits and half of any
Extended Benefits. 26 U.S.C. §§ 3301-11. See ACUC REPORT, supra note 68 at 84,
n.2.
84. GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at 30.
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workers' wages for which an employer must pay a tax. The current
cap, $7,000, was significantly below the average annual wage of
$25,500 in 1992.85 By 1992, the ratio of taxable wages to covered
wages had fallen to the lowest level yet, 36%.86 One proposal
would link the cap to the earnings base for Old Age Security and
Disability Insurance (OASDI), currently $61,200. The current $56
cost per worker of the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA)
tax in 1992 was close to its lowest historic level.87
Comparisons with the Group of Seven ("G7") nations' unem-
ployment compensation systems dramatically illustrate how out-of-
line the United States taxable wage base has become. A 1992 con-
gressional report places the U.S. at the very bottom. The median
U.S. state base of $8,250 is over 30% less than that of the next
lowest country, Canada.88 The United States national average tax
rate applied to taxable wages in covered employment is 1.9% state
and 0.8% federal. The total of 2.7% compares to rates of 4.3%
(Germany), 5.4% (Canada), 6.95% (France). 89 That report also il-
lustrates that the United States is very close to the bottom of the
G7 countries in public expenditures for UI as a percent of Gross
Domestic Product. 90
IV. "Unemployment Assistance" Is Needed for Those With
Insufficient Labor Force Connection
Amending the Unemployment Compensation program is not the
entire answer to ensuring replacement income for unemployed
workers. Political reality requires that employer-financed benefits
must be of limited duration and cover only those persons with a
significant labor-force connection. 91 Employable but unemployed
persons without a minimal connection to the labor force need some
other form of protection.
The inherent inadequacy of the unemployment compensation
program even as originally conceived, has long been recognized.
85. ACUC REPORT, supra note 68 at 107.
86. McHugh Testimony, supra note 77 at 9.
87. Id. at 109, tbl. 7-7. See, e.g., CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 930 (West 1995).
While some states have chosen a slightly higher state taxable wage base, many, includ-
ing California, have not. The $7000 state cap was established in 1984.
88. G-7 REPORT, supra note 43, at 12, chart 2A.
89. Id at 12, chart 2B.
90. Id. at 14, chart 3. In the same study, the United States compares unfavorably
in other respects. For example, the United States is the only country with a lag quar-
ter rule. Id. at 16, tbl. 2.
91. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
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In 1980, for example, the Federal Government's National Commis-
sion on Unemployment Compensation ("NCUC"), 92 was "deeply
concerned about the substantial number of unemployed individuals
who exhaust all UC benefits to which they are entitled" and be-
lieved that "every effort must be made to limit the extent to which
unemployed persons must apply for and receive welfare. '93 The
NCUC consequently recommended, by a vote of 11-0-1, the estab-
lishment of "a program of income-tested benefits, administered
completely separately from unemployment compensation, to pro-
vide some minimum protection for all unemployed persons ex-
hausting or not eligible for unemployment compensation benefits
and for whom no other job or program is available. '94
Such a program could still be enacted at the federal level, but
preserve a degree of control for the states. It would cover unem-
ployed persons who have exhausted their benefits or are ineligible
for UI benefits for the many different reasons discussed earlier.
The income would replace current welfare benefits and, ideally,
would be sufficient to raise a person or family above the official
federal poverty line.95 Requirements for receiving unemployment
assistance would include participation in a job search program, as
currently required by the UC program. The program would also
be "means tested," but would not necessarily require a complete
"spend-down" of assets for eligibility.96 Those unable to find regu-
lar employment after a certain period of time could move into a
public service job or continue training.
Such Unemployment Assistance programs exist in several Euro-
pean countries. The congressional report cited earlier notes that
France, Germany and the United Kingdom provide such assistance
92. This group, chaired by Wilbur Cohen, was the predecessor of today's Advisory
Council on Unemployment Compensation.
93. NATIONAL CoMMIsSION ON UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION, UNEMPLOY-
MENT COMPENSATION: FINAL REPORT 172 (1980) [hereinafter NCUC REPORT].
94. Id.
95. Currently, benefit levels for low-wage workers fall far below the federal pov-
erty level. For example, weekly wages (excluding such additional income as E1TC) of
$193 would keep a mother and child slightly above the federal poverty line. However,
at that level of earnings, the mother's weekly UI amount would be approximately $90
in California. CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § "1280 (West 1986). Her only recourse would
be supplemental income from AFDC benefits. One policy option now being debated
is the "child support assurance" program which would provide a guaranteed level of
benefits to every child without means testing. Paula Roberts of the Center on Law
and Social Policy has developed such a concept. Legislation establishing such a pro-
gram on a pilot basis in several counties in California passed out of a California Sen-
ate committee in May, 1995. S.B. 971, Cal. 1995-96, Reg. Sess. (1995).
96. NCUC REPORT, supra note 90 at 171.
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to unemployed individuals irrespective of their attachment to the
work force.97 Financed by national treasuries rather than through
employer-funded insurance, such unemployment assistance insures
that employable persons are readily connected to local employ-
ment agencies, have access to job training programs and receive a
minimum stipend to survive. 98 Currently, most recipients of public
assistance have little or no access to job training programs.
The program would be funded mainly by the federal govern-
ment, but would include contributions from employers, primarily
those who hire largely contingent workers, such as part-time em-
ployees of fast-food restaurants.99 The program would be adminis-
tered by the Department of Labor through its UI division. 100
V. Why Income Maintenance Programs Make Fiscal Sense
Although the proposals set forth above would be expensive, they
would be fiscally prudent. In the legislative rush to balance the
federal budget by institutionalizing the destitution of poor people,
legislators forget that any program that puts money directly in the
hands of poor people when they are in need provides an immedi-
ate, counter-cyclical stimulus to the economy. 10 1 Poor people
97. GAO REPORT, supra note 2.
98. France, for example, has a number of job training programs for young people
with or without high school diplomas, all of which pay a stipend that is a percentage of
the minimum wage. These programs last from three months to three years depending
on the particular program. None require any connection to the work force to access
the programs which are run by the national employment agency, l'Agence Nationale
Pour l'Emploi. SECRETARIAT D'ETAT CHARG9 DE LA FORMATION PROFESSION-
NELLE, DILfiGATION A LA FORMATION PROFESSIONNELLE, CREDIT FORMATION
JEUNES: QUESTIONS, REPONSES (1989).
99. The responsibility of such employers to contribute into the unemployment sys-
tem cannot be overstated. By employer design, virtually their entire work force is
made up of part-time workers ineligible for UI benefits.
100. Such a mechanism is analogous to the administration by the Social Security
Administration of both the Old Age, Survivors and Disability Insurance (OASDI)
program, Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-33 (1988 & Supp. V
1993), which is funded in part by employers and employees, and the Supplemental
Security Income (SSI) program, Title XVI of the Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-85, which is
funded through federal (and some state) revenues but no employer/employee
contributions.
101. The Secretary of Labor stressed this point in testimony before Congress in
1935:
I really believe that putting purchasing power in the form of unemployment
insurance benefits in the hands of the people at the moment when the de-
pression begins and when the first groups begin to be laid off is bound to
have a beneficial effect. Not only will you stabilize their purchases, but
through stabilization of their purchases you will keep other industries from
going downward, and immediately you spread work by that very device.
956
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spend all of their income for goods and services, saving nothing.
The local economy benefits directly. A one dollar increase in con-
sumer spending can have as much as a five to six dollar beneficial
impact as it "ripples" through the economy. Fifty thousand dollars
of economic activity translates into a new job. Economists call this
the "multiplier effect" of money placed in the hands of
consumers.10 2
While little data exists on this issue as it relates to welfare bene-
fits, two 1987 studies are noteworthy. A Georgia study concluded
that $350 million in state expenditures brought in almost $1 billion
in federal money, generated a total economic stimulus of over $4
billion, created over 50,000 new jobs and generated state and local
taxes of nearly $50 million.10 3 Kentucky Legal Services presented
data to the Kentucky Legislature in 1987 that estimated that each
additional expenditure of $60-70,000 would create one new job. °4
Policymakers must once again consider economic stimulus when
examining UI benefits and coverage. In the GAO study cited
above, the authors concluded that the ability of the UI program to
stabilize the economy has diminished considerably over time. 0 5
Twenty billion dollars more in benefits would have been available
during the 1990-91 recession had the wage replacement rate and
UI benefit payments been at the 1974-75 levels.10 6 Between 1980
Hearings on H.R. 4120 Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 74th Cong., 1st
Sess. 214 (1935) (statement of Secretary of Labor). Economic stimulus was once a
major aim of the UI program. The Supreme Court noted in 1970 that in passing the
legislation, Congress recognized that "[elarly payment of insurance benefits serves to
prevent a decline in the purchasing power of the unemployed, which in turn serves to
aid industries producing goods and services." California Human Resources Dep't v.
Java, 402 U.S. 121, 132 (1971).
102. See, e.g., Robert Scheer, Los Angeles Times Interview: Peter Ueberroth. A
Man of Privilege Aims to Get Down and Dirty to Rebuild L.A., L.A. TIMES, May 17,
1992, at 7. Peter Ueberroth, who headed efforts to rebuild Los Angeles after the Rod-
ney King uprising in 1991, said that California Governor Pete Wilson's proposal to
slash welfare benefits by 25% would be "a major, negative blow to our efforts" to
rebuild South Central Los Angeles, where 60% of the people survive on welfare. The
interview noted that money applied to make welfare payments has a "multiplier ef-
fect," in that the aid helps not only the particular individuals collecting welfare, but
stimulates the economy as well. Id.
103. PETER BATEMAN, INNOVATIVE SOLUTIONS, INC., ESTIMATING THE ECONOMIC
IMPACT OF PUBLIC WELFARE PROGRAMS ON THE GEORGIA ECONOMY (1987).
104. RICHARD SECKEL, OFFICE OF KENTUCKY LEGAL SERVICES PROGRAMS,
AFDC AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: IMPLICATIONS FOR KENTUCKY OF RESEARCH
IN SOUTHERN STATES (1987). The Kentucky Legislature increased AFDC benefits
that year by 4.5%.
105. GAO REPORT, supra note 2 at 42.
106. Id.
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and 1990, the portion of total lost wages replaced by UI benefits
decreased by about 18%.107
Beyond economic arguments of counter-cyclical effect is the fis-
cal reality of caring for the destitute. As millions of unemployed
workers find they are not eligible for any benefits, government
must spend money on shelter and food support just to prevent peo-
ple from dying.10 8 As increasing numbers become permanently
disabled from work, their dependence on SSI will continue to drain
our economy. Hopefully, as policymakers contemplate more con-
structive welfare reform than that now being considered, they will
give considerable weight to the economic effects of their decisions.
For the inner cities particularly, those effects could be catastrophic
if the wrong choices are made.
VI. Conclusion
The current welfare debate should acknowledge the deficiencies
in the unemployment compensation system. As long as the current
system is unable to protect unemployed workers, those persons will
be forced to rely on public assistance. Reform efforts that urge all
persons in poverty to get a job ring hollow when there are no jobs
to be found. Even persons who do find work often do not earn
enough to rise above the poverty level. Policymakers should real-
ize that a stronger unemployment compensation system would ease
the burden currently shouldered by the public assistance system.
A new program of unemployment assistance to protect those
persons most likely to be ineligible for UI under the current system
is needed to keep those persons from turning to public assistance.
Such a program would provide economic stimulus and would pro-
tect unemployed persons from falling into poverty. The new sys-
tem would protect persons who currently slip through the safety
net, those who are ineligible to receive UI benefits but who cannot
receive public assistance either. Instead of blaming persons for
their unemployment or poverty, this system would admit that a cer-
tain degree of unemployment is inevitable and help those persons
continue to contribute to the economy until they can find more
work.
107. Id. at 43.
108. This burden is being increasingly borne by local governments as both federal
and state governments, wrestling with budget deficits that are out of control, cut back
on all benefit programs. See supra note 34 discussing states that are facing difficult
budgetary decisions in face of rising public welfare costs.
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Appendix A
Unemployment Rate for Civilian Labor Force Based on Full-
Time Equivalent Employment (Figures in 000s) 109
1993
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) Labor Force .................. 129,525
Resident Arm ed Forces ............................................ 1,485
BLS Civilian Labor Force ...................................... 128,040
BLS Civilian Employment ...................................... 119,306
OFFICIAL UNEMPLOYMENT RATE ................................. 6.8%
Adjusted Civilian Labor Force Based on Full-time Equivalent
Em ploym ent ................................................ 119,810
Combined Full-Time and Full-Time Equivalent Employment ... 108,773
FULL-TIME EQUIVALENT UNEMPLOYMENT RATE ................. 9.2%
Discouraged Workers ..... ................................ 1,129
Adjusted Labor Force Including Discouraged Workers .......... 120,939
FULL-TIME EQUIVALENT UNEMPLOYMENT RATE INCLUDING
DISCOURAGED WORKERS ................................. 10.1%
Civilians Not in the Labor Force Who Want Jobs ................. 6,319
Adjusted Labor Force Including Civilians Not in the Labor
Force W ho W ant Jobs ........................................ 126,129
JOBLESS R ATE .................................................... 13.8%
109. Dembo & Morehouse, supra note 12 at 42, tbl. 8.

